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China’s Orphan Welfare System:
Laws, Policies And Filled Gaps
Anna Jane High*
This article presents a socio-legal analysis of the care of orphaned and
other vulnerable children in China, reviewing law, policy and practice
relating to state and non-state orphanages and foster homes. The
analysis is first contextualized by an introduction to the demographics
of children cared for in state and non-state welfare institutions;
prevailing social and cultural attitudes to their rights and entitlements;
and the complex nexus between the politically high-stake issue of birth
planning and the arguably consequent vulnerability of such children.
The article then introduces formal laws and policies relating to the care
of orphans, including government duties and responsibilities towards
this vulnerable population. The findings of empirical fieldwork carried
out in China examining the role of “non-legal,” unregistered and
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unrecognized non-state actors/NGOs in filling gaps left by the formal
state orphan welfare system are then presented. Although the Chinese
government claims to take responsibility for orphans, and ostensibly
monopolizes the running of orphanages, it is failing to recognize,
regulate or oversee the prolific number of private orphanages that have
emerged in the last three decades in response to perceived gaps in
state-provided services. The emergence of unregulated non-state
orphanages, and the gap between child welfare laws and policies, on
the one hand, and practice on the other, has resulted in lines of
stratification being drawn among Chinese orphans in terms of their
access to care and adoption prospects. The implementation of clearer
policies, and improved access to formalized state support for the
currently informal non-state sector, are needed to promote better
outcomes for vulnerable children and caregivers alike, as well as to
better guard against sub-standard practices and neglect of orphans.
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INTRODUCTION
My name is Rose, I am from Hubei* and I am 18 years old. I lived
in a village with my parents and older sister. We were very happy
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children. Our parents cared for us. But one day, when I was four
years old, my older sister accidentally poured boiling water over my
head. I was in so much pain. Baba [my father] took me to the
doctor, who said to put toothpaste over the burns. My sister helped
me apply the toothpaste, but it only helped a little. I had terrible
wounds. Baba was so angry with my sister that he beat her. Not
only was I scarred, but my family was too poor to send me to
school. So one day Baba brought me to the door of the local
orphanage. A kind ayi [aunt] took me in, and I started my life there.
My ayi was really very kind to me. The other children were also
good. But they could be so strong-willed and sometimes rough,
sometimes bossy. We often had our differences. My scalp was
burned, and it left such a scar emotionally. I didn’t like to talk.
From the time I arrived, I stopped talking much. The children
started bullying me. The ayis were really kind to me, so the other
kids bullied me. My life there was the same every day. After each
meal, we played ballgames together – but I was just no good at
these, and they started excluding me. I started playing on my own. I
would watch the workers in the vegetable garden. I would spend
time on the roof. It was so high. I was scared. Every day, my life
was like this.1
I met Rose2 in 2010 in her home near Beijing. She lived in a private foster
home run by an American couple, which cares for children with special medical
needs coming from state-run orphanages. She is one of many children who have
been fostered from state orphanages across China, or abandoned directly, into the
informal care and guardianship of privately run orphanages and foster homes.
These homes are, for the most part, unregistered, and are not recognized by formal
law or policy. Rose’s life story, including her disfigurement and subsequent
abandonment, her childhood spent in a state orphanage, and her move as a
teenager to a privately-run home, is emblematic of the complex intersection of
social, cultural, and political factors pertaining to current laws and policies on the
care of orphans in China. This article undertakes a socio-legal analysis of the care
of orphaned and other vulnerable children in China by reviewing law, policy, and
practice relating to state and non-state orphanages and foster homes.
The analysis begins with an introduction of the demographics of children
cared for in state and non-state welfare institutions, prevailing social and cultural
1

Testimony of a resident at Compassion Family Life House.
Where referenced herein, people, organizations and place names are referred to by
pseudonyms to preserve anonymity.
2
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discourse and attitudes associated with abandonment and relating to the rights and
entitlements of abandoned children, and the complex association between the
politically high-stake issue of birth planning and the arguably consequent
vulnerability of such children. The article then introduces the formal laws and
policies relevant to the care of orphans, including government duties and
responsibilities towards this population, before presenting the findings of
empirical fieldwork carried out in China examining the role of “non-legal,”
unregistered, and unrecognized non-state actors or non-government organizations
(NGOs) in filling gaps left by the formal state orphan welfare system. I find that
although the Chinese government claims to take responsibility for orphans, and
ostensibly monopolizes the operation of welfare institutions, it is failing to
recognize, regulate or oversee the prolific number of private orphanages and foster
homes that have emerged in the last three decades in response to perceived gaps in
state-provided services. The emergence of such homes and the gap between child
welfare laws and policies on the one hand, and practice on the other, has resulted
in lines of stratification being drawn among Chinese orphans in terms of their
access to care and adoption prospects. The implementation of clearer policies, and
improved access to formalized state support for the currently informal non-state
sector, are needed to promote better outcomes for vulnerable children and
caregivers alike.
This Article is the culmination of numerous trips to various foster homes
and orphanages in China, carried out between 2005 and 2010. The subjects of this
study were approached based on personal introductions and chain-referral
sampling. This led to contacts with both state and non-state Chinese-run
orphanages. This Article is primarily based on interviews conducted between July
and October 2009 and between July and September 2010. Interviews were
conducted with representatives of twenty-seven state and private orphanages and
foster homes located in Hebei, Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Anhui, Zhejiang, and
Jiangsu provinces, and the Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai municipalities. In
addition, interviews were conducted with a number of child-related NGOs, both
foreign and Chinese, and a number of government and government-owned
departments and entities.3

3

Ministry of Civil Affairs China Charity and Donation Information Centre; Shandong
Charity Federation Office; Ministry of Civil Affairs NGO Service Centre.
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II. DEMOGRAPHICS OF VULNERABILITY
Dr. Xiaoyuan Shang, the leading Chinese researcher on vulnerable
children in China, categorizes children requiring welfare into three groups:
orphaned or abandoned children, children of prisoners, and street children.4 This
study focuses on the provision of welfare services to the former two groups; the
third group, which at times overlaps with the other two, includes victims of
kidnapping and child trafficking.5 Most orphaned and abandoned children live in
rural areas and many are also disabled.6 The term “orphan” is used loosely herein
and by Shang to refer to children who are no longer cared for by their parents.
Researchers believe the majority of children living in state and private orphanages
do, in fact, have one or both parents living, but have been abandoned for reasons
explored further below. 7 The Chinese term for orphan, gu’er—gu meaning
“solitary,” “isolated,” or “alone,” and er meaning “child”—accommodates these
various life circumstances more than the English translation.
According to the most recent government study on vulnerable children in
China, carried out by Shang and commissioned by the Ministry of Civil Affairs
(MCA), as of April 2005 there were 573,371 orphaned children in China, 8
although the number may be underreported. 9 The study ambiguously defines
4

Xiaoyuan Shang et al., Welfare Provision for Vulnerable Children: The Missing Role of
the State, 181 CHINA Q. 122, 124-25 (2005) [hereinafter Shang et al., Welfare Provision].
5
Id. at 125.
6
Id. at 124.
7
Id. at 124 (noting that 95% of children in Chinese government care are abandoned); see
generally CORRINA CSAKY, SAVE THE CHILDREN, KEEPING CHILDREN OUT OF HARMFUL
INSTITUTIONS: WHY WE SHOULD BE INVESTING IN FAMILY-BASED CARE 1 (2009),
available
at
http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/Keeping_Children_Out_of_Har
mful_Institutions_Final_20.11.09_1.pdf (noting that this is a feature of orphanages
generally).
8
XIAOYUAN SHANG, ZHONGGUO GUER ZHUANGKUANG YANJIU (
)
[SURVIVAL CHILDREN: A STUDY OF THE CONDITION OF ORPHANS IN CHINA] 10 (2008)
[hereinafter SHANG, SURVIVAL CHILDREN].
9
The total number of orphans may be under-reported by the study because many orphaned
and abandoned children, including those living in many of the private orphanages
interviewed, do not possess hukou [residency permits] and, thus, are unlikely to be
included in official statistics. See Shang et al., Welfare Provision, supra note 4, at 129 n.28
(noting that the children in unregistered private orphanages “have no legal status”). Hukou
refers to an individual’s residency permit under the Chinese Household Registration
System. It primarily functions as a type of internal passport system: residents of China who
are not registered under the hukou system do not possess legal personality and face grave
(continued next page)
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orphans as young people who have lost their parents—it is unclear if this would
include, for example, children whose guardians are in prison, or children who have
been abandoned. The Joint Ministerial Opinion on Strengthening Orphan Relief
puts the figure at 573,000, using the same definition.10 Of these, around 66,000 are
in the care of state welfare institutes, and 295,000 receive “state institutional aid”
of some kind,11 which means that approximately one third of China’s reported
orphan population does not receive institutional aid relief, and less than twelve
percent reside in state facilities, not all of which are exclusively for children.12
More than eighty-six percent of the reported orphan population is registered as
rural householders. 13 Less than 0.1% are residents of the three model urban
orphanage centers of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin.14
In addition, there are a large number of children whose primary caregivers
are serving long-term or life sentences. Due to discrimination experienced by
children of prisoners in society and the consequent dearth of community-based
difficulties in obtaining access to civic entitlements such as health care, education and
employment. Tiejun Cheng & Mark Selden, The Origins and Social Consequences of
China’s Hukou System, 139 CHINA Q. 644, 644 (1994) (noting that hukou registration
provides the “principal basis for establishing identity, citizenship and proof of official
status,” and is required to establish eligibility for social welfare, employment, education
and marriage).
10
MINZHENGBU (
) [MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS], GUANYU JIAQIANG GU’ER
JIUZHU GONGZUO DE YIJIAN (
) [JOINT MINISTERIAL
OPINION
ON
STRENGTHENING
ORPHAN
RELIEF]
(2006),
available
at
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-04/14/content_254233.htm [hereinafter STRENGTHENING
ORPHAN RELIEF].
11
SHANG, SURVIVAL CHILDREN, supra note 8, at 10, 26 (reporting that of the orphans
receiving state institutional aid, 53,073 receive city-level government support, 124,546 are
supported through the nongcun wubao system, and 115,637 by the rural poverty household
aid scheme). Nongcun wubao (literally, “Rural Five Guarantees”) is “a [rural] communitybased welfare system that provides the five guarantees of free food, clothes, fuel, health
services, and education or funeral arrangements as appropriate for the elderly, sick and
disabled as well as for orphans who are not only unable to look after themselves but also
have no one legally responsible for their welfare.” Xiaoyuan Shang, Looking for a Better
Way to Care for Children: Cooperation between the State and Civil Society in China, 76
SOC. SERV. REV. 203, 206 (2002) [hereinafter Shang, Better Way]; see also CHAK KWAN
CHAN ET AL., SOCIAL POLICY IN CHINA: DEVELOPMENT AND WELL-BEING 71-85 (2008)
(outlining the development of the nongcun wubao program); LINDA WONG,
MARGINALIZATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN CHINA 132 (1998) (“By 1958 . . . [i]ndigent
and unattached persons could get help through the ‘five guarantees’ and communal relief
schemes.”).
12
SHANG, SURVIVAL CHILDREN, supra note 8, at 10, 26-27 (2008).
13
Id. at 10.
14
Id.
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care and assistance, such children may face a greater risk of neglect than
orphans.15 Beijing Star Village is a non-government home that cares for such
children, and Madam Leng, its founder and director, has opened other homes
across six provinces that have this mission. She states that “[o]n their own, the
children would be left without shelter . . . . They suffer like orphans, but are
unqualified to be taken in by a charity,” and estimates that there are several
hundred thousand children in similar situations across China, although many of
these are cared for by extended family or neighbors.16

III. ABANDONMENT IN CHINA: DISCOURSE AND ATTITUDES
A. Abandonment as a Crime
Several Chinese statutes list abandonment as a crime, including the
Marriage Law, 17 the Adoption Law, 18 the Protection of Minors Law, 19 the

15

Interviews with Madam Leng, Director, Star Village, in Beijing (Aug. 20, 2009 and
Aug. 9, 2010); see also Shang et al., Welfare Provision, supra note 4, at 127 (“[T]he
children of long-term prisoners are not entitled to any state welfare provision.”).
16
Interviews with Madam Leng, Director, Star Village, supra note 15.
17
Hunyin Fa (
) [Marriage Law], art. 3 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Sept. 10, 1980, effective Jan. 1, 1981, amended Apr. 28, 2001) 2001
China Law LEXIS 2155 (“Maltreatment and desertion of one family member by another
shall be prohibited.”); see also id. art. 21 (“Infanticide by drowning, abandonment of
infants and all other acts causing serious harm to infants shall be prohibited.”); id. art. 45
(“The person who commits . . . maltreatment or abandonment of a family member, if it
constitutes a crime, shall be investigated for criminal responsibility in accordance with the
law.”). Other articles specify that in the case of an underage child whose parents are
deceased or unable to care for them, the grandparents or siblings are obligated to bring up
the child. Id. arts. 28-29.
18
Shouyang Fa (
) [Adoption Law], art. 31 (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1991, amended Nov. 4, 1988) 1998 China Law LEXIS 990
(“Whoever abandons an infant shall be fined by a public security organ; if the act
constitutes a crime, the offender shall be investigated for criminal responsibility in
accordance with law.”).
19
Weicheng Nianren Baohu Fa (
) [Law on the Protection of Minors], art.
10 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Of the People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1991, revised
Dec. 29, 2006, effective June 1, 2007) 2006 China Law LEXIS 9895 (“It is prohibited to
commit family violence against minors, or to maltreat or forsake minors. Infanticide and
other acts of cruelly killing infants shall be prohibited. No one may discriminate against
female or handicapped minors.”).
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Protection of the Disabled Law,20 and the Law Protecting the Rights and Interests
of Women and Children.21 However, prosecution for abandonment under such
laws is, in general, rare because of the lack of adequate enforcement
mechanisms. 22 Further, sanctions, when imposed, are normally lenient, which
arguably renders the legislation largely ineffective.23 Similarly, Johnson’s study
found that “most people who abandoned children were not punished, even though
most were unable to keep the act a secret,” and punishments, when imposed,
consisted of fines, sometimes coupled with sterilization for the birth mother.24
Punishments were almost always administered by birth planning authorities, rather
than judicial institutions: “What has been at stake in the government’s concern
over abandonment is not protecting the interests or legal rights of the children
involved but maintaining a firm grip on birth planning and population control.”25
However, several Chinese interviewees told me that one reason babies are
commonly abandoned at private orphanages rather than state facilities is out of
fear on the part of the abandoning parent of incurring state sanctions. Thus, while
criminalization is not necessarily a sufficiently strong deterrent to prevent
abandonment, it seems to be contributing to the abandonment of children into the
care of non-state orphanages.

20

Canjiren Baozhang Fa (
) [Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons],
art. 9 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 1990, effective
May 15, 1991) 1990-1992 FALÜ QUANSHU 1268 (China), translated in 14 P.R.C. LAWS &
REGS V-03-00-101 (“[M]altreatment and abandoning of disabled persons shall be
prohibited.”).
21
Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa (
) [Law on the Protection of Rights and
Interests of Women], art. 38 (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 3, 1992,
revised Aug. 28, 2005) 1992 China Law LEXIS 455 (“Women’s right of life and health
shall be inviolable. It shall be prohibited to drown, abandon or cruelly injure or kill female
babies.”).
22
Kay Johnson et al., Infant Abandonment and Adoption in China, 24 POPULATION & DEV.
REV. 469, 479 (1998) (“Most commentators agree that there have been few prosecutions
for the escalating crime of abandonment.”); see also Xiaorong Li, License to Coerce:
Violence Against Women, State Responsibility, and Legal Failures in China’s FamilyPlanning Program, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 145, 169 (1996) (noting that “legal
instruments have rarely been utilized to render punishment or remedies” for violations of
the rights and interests of children).
23
Haiyan Li et al., Beijingshi Gucan Ertong Bei Yiqide Yuanyin Fenxi (
) [An Analysis of Reasons Behind the Abandonment of Orphans and
Disabled Children in Beijing], 4(1) BEIJING SHEHUI KEXUE (
) [BEIJING
SOC. SCI.] 82, 87 (2004).
24
Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 479-480.
25
Id. at 480.
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B. Demographics of Abandonment
I have seen a lot of fathers and mothers come not for
rehabilitation, but just to know where to leave their children. I am
frequently able to convince them that it is not a good idea, but it is
quite a common idea. They say, “Oh but it’s better the child is
taken in by a sister, because they know what to do, I don’t know
what to do with him”. But he is your child!26
This baby girl was born on – 1992 at 5:30 A.M. and is now 100
days old . . . . She is in good health and has never suffered any
illness. Because of the current political situation and heavy
pressures that are too difficult to explain, we, who were her
parents for these first days, cannot continue taking care of her. We
can only hope that in this world there is a kind-hearted person
who will care for her. Thank you. In regret and shame, your father
and mother.27
Statistics on the rate of abandonment in China are scarce. There is
arguably a connection between birth control policies and abandonment rates,28 a
connection that has, in some areas, been expressly acknowledged within the
MCA.29 For example, Kay Johnson reports that an investigative report of the
26

Carlotta, an Italian nurse who works with Catholic private orphanages to improve
medical standards, speaking with amazement of the numbers of Chinese parents bringing
their disabled children to the Catholic rehabilitation center. Interview with Carlotta, nurse,
in Guanghui, Hebei (Jul. 10, 2010).
27
Note accompanying an infant abandoned in Hunan province, reproduced in KAY
JOHNSON, WANTING A DAUGHTER, NEEDING A SON: ABANDONMENT, ADOPTION, AND
ORPHANAGE CARE IN CHINA 75 (2004).
28
Id. at 50 (referring to abandoned infant girls as “victims of [birth-planning] policies”);
see also Kay Johnson, The Politics of the Revival of Infant Abandonment in China, with
Special Reference to Hunan, 22 POPULATION & DEV. R. 77, 78 (1996) (discussing
provincial statistics indicating a nexus between birth control policies and abandonment);
Ming Tsui & Lynne Rich, The Only Child and Educational Opportunity for Girls in Urban
China, 16 GENDER & SOC. 74, 74 (2002) (noting the abandonment of baby girls as a
negative consequence of China’s one-child policy). C.f. Therese Hesketh and Wei Xing
Zhu, Health in China: The One Child Family Policy: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
314 BRIT. MED. J. 1685, 1687 (1997) (arguing that abandonment is not attributable to birth
planning policies, as it was “common long before the one child policy”).
29
The central MCA is the administrative authority responsible for social and
administrative affairs, including welfare programs for marginal groups. MCA bureaus at
(continued next page)
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Hunan MCA “makes explicit the connection between abandonment and birthplanning campaigns [and] even regards the province’s welfare centers as
barometers of birth-planning work in particular areas: when birth-planning work is
“‘grasped tightly,’ more foundlings are received in local welfare facilities.”30 As
such, local and central “birth-planning officials have compelling reasons to
obscure the problem [of abandonment].”31 For example, “[d]rawing attention to
abandonment is seen as an implicit criticism of birth-planning policies, and birthplanning officials complain that such efforts make their work more difficult.”32
The incidence of abandonment is further obscured by informal adoptions, which
mean that many abandoned children are unaccounted for in official statistics and
estimates of orphan numbers.33
Julie Jimmerson cites a Chinese study conducted in Guangdong province,
which estimates that infant abandonment for the entire province was
approximately 10,000 per year between 1987 and 1989.34 Ninety percent of those
abandoned infants were female, and 22.6% were disabled or deformed.35 Johnson
notes a commonly cited figure of 160,000 abandoned children nation-wide,36 but
concedes that “‘hard data’ concerning abandonment are extremely difficult to
obtain”. 37 A more recent study claims that more than 10,000 children are
abandoned annually in China.38 The United Nations Committee on the Rights of
the Child’s most recent report on China expresses concern about “the significant
number of children abandoned on the mainland and the large number of children
living in institutions,” and the “lack of precise statistical data” relating to this
population.39

both provincial and local level complement it. See generally MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS,
http://mca.gov.cn.
30
JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 57.
31
Id. at 50.
32
Id. at 66.
33
Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 502 (“[T]o a significant though unknown extent,
adoptive parents have emerged spontaneously to handle the crisis of abandonment created
by population control policies, many of them defying government adoption law and policy
to do so.”).
34
Julie Jimmerson, Female Infanticide in China: An Examination of Cultural and Legal
Norms, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 47, 73 (1990).
35
Id.
36
Johnson, supra note 28, at 91.
37
Id. at 77.
38
Xiaoyuan Shang et al., Discrimination Against Children with Disability in China, 20
INT’L J. SOC. WELFARE 298, 299 (2011).
39
Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Rep. on its 40th Sess., Sept. 19-Sept. 20, 2005, U.N.
Doc. No. CRC/C/CHN/CO/2 (Nov. 24, 2005).
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Rose’s life story bears witness to the confluence of disadvantages and
socio-economic factors that underlie the problem of abandonment in China today,
including gender, disability, and poverty.40 The issue of infant abandonment in
China, and more particularly the impact of birth control policies and cultural
constructions of gender on the demographics of de facto “orphans,” has received
much scholarly and media attention, with the most comprehensive study being that
of Johnson, Huang Banghan and Wang Liyao. In Infant Abandonment and
Adoption in China, Johnson and her colleagues present the results of a 1995–96
study of 392 families who had adopted children and 237 families who had
abandoned children.41 The study introduces China’s long history of infanticide and
abandonment of female children,42 including how, despite improved rural living
standards since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, “birth planning efforts in the
1980s appeared to revive the twin problems of infanticide and abandonment,
particularly the latter.”43 Johnson found that gender, birth order, and the gender
composition of siblings were the most important determinants of who was
abandoned.44 The vast majority of the cases of abandoning families were from
agricultural—as opposed to urban—hukou families, 45 but they did not find a
relationship between abandonment and relative impoverishment.
Other studies note the high incidence of disability among children who are
residents of state orphanages: for example, Shang, Wu and Li’s 2005 study puts
the figure at 80.5%.46 However, it may be that “disability” is at times defined
40

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, DEATH BY DEFAULT: A POLICY OF FATAL NEGLECT IN
CHINA’S STATE ORPHANAGES 14 (1996) (“Rural poverty, prejudice against the disabled,
traditional attitudes towards female children, and the pressures generated by the country’s
stringent population policy all contribute to the problem [of abandonment].”); see also
Shang, Better Way, supra note 11, at 208 (discussing discrimination against women, rural
poverty, social changes and family planning policies as factors behind abandonment in
China).
41
Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 483, 479.
42
See also Li et al., supra note 23, at 85; Jimmerson, supra note 34, at 66 (providing
statistics suggesting a disproportionate abandonment or infanticide of female babies). The
phenomenon is not, of course, uniquely Chinese.
43
Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 472 (stating that this may be the result of the strict
penalties for over-quota births, combined with culturally and economically motivated
preferences for healthy, male children).
44
Id. at 475.
45
For a description of the hukou, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
46
Xiaoyuan Shang, Xiaoming Wu & Haiyan Li, Shehui Zhengce, Shehui Xinbie yu
Zhongguo de Ertong Yiqi Wenti (
) [Social
Policy, Social Gender and the Problem of Infant Abandonment in China], 4 YOUTH
STUDIES 1, 1 (2005).
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broadly by orphanage and government officials to include, for example, relatively
minor conditions such as cleft lips or birthmarks.47 Johnson notes that the Chinese
government, “defensive after attacks by Western human rights groups, often refers
only to ‘abandoned disabled children and orphans’ when discussing its orphanage
population, implying that healthy children are not abandoned in China today.”48
Human Rights Watch likewise claims, “[U]nfounded diagnoses of mental
retardation and other disorders . . . have helped to disseminate the widespread
belief—which appears to be quite inaccurate—that virtually all of China’s
abandoned children are physically or mentally handicapped.”49 In any event, it
would be problematic to speculate on the rate of disability among abandoned
children based on purported disability incidences among institutionalized orphans
because, according to Johnson’s empirical research, “[i]t appears that many
healthy abandoned children are found and quickly adopted without ever coming to
the attention of the authorities.”50 Sick and disabled children, on the other hand,
are unlikely to be informally adopted in this way, and thus are more likely to be
put in state care.51
Almost all of the children living in the non-state orphanages and foster
homes I visited were either disabled or in need of surgical intervention. Here,
“disabled” is used narrowly: the most common conditions observed were cerebral
palsy, Down syndrome, blindness, paraplegia, mental retardation, club feet or
missing limbs, spina bifida, and congenital heart disorders. The intersection of
disability and abandonment was a common thread in my interviews, with most
informants focusing on socio-cultural attitudes to disability and a lack of state
welfare support for parents of disabled children as primary motivators behind
abandonment. This is consistent with studies by Chinese scholars that have
emphasized disability as a crucial factor in determining whether to abandon a
child.52 The language often used by Chinese interviewees was that of such children
being “thrown away” (rengdiao) rather than “abandoned or forsaken” (yiqi), which
echoes the common colloquial term for social outcasts (including both orphans and
47

Human Rights Watch, supra note 40, at 207-208 (discussing official orphanage and
government records deeming a large proportion of the institutionalized orphan population
disabled, and asserting a “widespread practice of false medical labelling”); see also
Interview with Will Peters, founder and CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing (Aug. 25,
2009).
48
Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 500.
49
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 40, at 5–6.
50
Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 500.
51
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disabled people), feiren (literally, “garbage people”). Most orphanage workers
spoke with sympathy of the plight of rural farmers whose only child is born with
grave special needs, and for whom access to state aid is difficult:
Why are they abandoned? The main thing is their bodily defects.
Because you know, in the rural villages, if you have a disabled
child like this, parents would have to spend a lot of money. And
they’re not able to go to work. So they have no choice. It’s not
that they are willing and content to throw their child away, that’s
not the mentality. It causes them great hardship, but they are
compelled by their circumstances. You know very often, we have
clothes and money left at our door—the parents know that their
children are here, but they do not dare to come and visit, and see
their child themselves. In their hearts they must suffer greatly. We
have had mothers who came back because of the deep regret they
have felt.53
Johnson argues that while policy changes may be ineffective in increasing the
adoption rate of disabled children, abandonment, a “practice clearly associated
with great personal pain and shrouded in shameful collective silence,”54 could be
reduced by supporting parents in their care of such children:
People who abandon disabled children usually say they have no
means to treat or raise the child, that the burden is too great.
Furthermore the parents usually cannot place disabled children in
state institutions without having to bear the financial burden, a
burden too onerous for most families. If the state attempted to
assume this financial burden for those who cannot afford the cost
without undue hardship, these parents could place their children in
state institutions but maintain ties with them. In some cases,
providing financial support directly to families of disabled
children might allow them to remain at home. The development of
this sort of welfare policy is expensive, but housing abandoned
disabled children is too. It is also destructive to the moral fabric of
a society to have ordinary people pushed into abandoning their
children.55
53

Interview with Sister Qin, founder and manager, Our Lady’s Home for Handicapped
Children, in Hebei (Jul. 21, 2010).
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This view was repeatedly echoed by the interviewees in the current study.
Similarly, in its latest report on China, the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child has recommended that the state “develop effective strategies to prevent the
abandonment of children, which include early identification of families and
children at risk and the possibility for social workers to intervene and help families
directly.”56

C. Kinship, Fostering and Adoption
To contextualize China’s orphan welfare system, it is necessary to explore
cultural norms related to kinship, the child’s place in Chinese families, and
adoption. Traditional Chinese law, predicated on Confucian norms of filial piety
and the sanctity of filial bloodlines, prohibited adoption outside of one’s clan,57
and traditional Chinese texts “argue against adoption.”58 This view was echoed by
some Chinese interviewees in the current study: “It’s harder to imagine taking in a
stranger because family is so valued. It’s much easier to take in your sister’s child,
or your brother’s child—that’s why adoption rates are very low in China.”59
Guanghui Home has experienced many problems with using informal foster care
arrangements to supplement the provision of care at their central orphanage, due to
the way in which such foster children are regarded by their foster families:
They [foster children] are outsiders. They are not part of your
family. This can be a problem, I think. Fostership is not
considered permanent, because eventually everyone knows the
family will get ill, or have family troubles, and the child will be
returned [to the orphanage].60
56
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Thurston, In a Chinese Orphanage, 277 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 28 (1996), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/96apr/orphan/orphan.htm (noting the growing
number of Americans who are adopting Chinese children).
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Interview with Chinese lawyer for New Grace Foundation, a foreign-run foster home
outside of Beijing, in Beijing (Jul. 7, 2010).
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also Interview with Lifei Chen, researcher, Beijing Normal University, in Beijing (Aug. 5,
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However, Johnson argues that certain strains of both Confucianism and
modern culture “support adoptive ties outside as well as inside bloodlines and
support the adoption of both boys and girls to build family and kinship.”61 This
“competing ideology”62 is most evident in the notion of mingling zi (“mulberry
insect children”). This was a term used in imperial China to refer to children
adopted outside of the patrilineal bloodline. A folk tale of the time told of wasps
“[taking] the young of the mulberry insect and transform[ing] them into young
wasps” by tapping on their nest and praying “[b]e like me, be like me.”63 Thus a
“mulberry insect child” was “one who becomes the child of someone other than
his or her birthparents,” a metaphor which Johnson remarks is “remarkable in its
near total denial of the significance of heredity in shaping the child.”64 Rather than
a denial of Confucian norms, the concept of an adopted child being transformed by
adoption is, in fact, premised on a “Confucian emphasis on upbringing and
cultivation as the key to character.”65
One of Johnson’s key findings was a pattern of informal adoption of
abandoned children: “[P]eople expressed few qualms about adopting children of
unknown parentage as long as they were basically healthy, that is, without
congenital disabilities.”66 Further, a prevalent assertion among Johnson’s sample
of adoptive families was that feelings of love and obligation towards adopted
children were at least as strong as those for birth-children, with the “low status and
fragility of adoptive ties that seemed to have characterized adoption practices in
the past” only reflected in a small number of cases.67 Importantly, despite almost
all adoptions being informal and occurring outside the government adoption
channels, the adoptive parents in the sample viewed their new parental rights and
duties as “complete and permanent.”68 While this view contrasts with that of some
interviewees in the current study, who spoke of extensive informal foster networks
around the private orphanages in which bringing in an unrelated child is viewed
differently, for other interviewees, the foster relationship is viewed similarly to the
informal adoptive relationship studied by Johnson:
61
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They [local foster families] really love the kids. It’s more than just
the money. We’ve got a few families who don’t want to do it
again, because they fostered a child who was adopted and it just
broke their hearts to say goodbye. It’s nice in a way; it shows how
much love was being poured out.69
Johnson concludes that, unlike in other cultures, such as Korea, where
negative attitudes towards extra-familial adoption mean there are insufficient
adoptive homes for homeless children, popular Chinese culture is supportive of the
adoption of unrelated children, with government policy being the biggest obstacle
to placing healthy abandoned children in homes.70 The rules and conditions for
domestic adoption are restrictive and in line with the population control objectives
of China’s One Child Policy. Until recently, the Adoption Law restricted domestic
adoption (except in the case of disabled children and “true orphans”) to parents
who are childless and over the age of thirty-five.71 In 1998, the Adoption Law was
amended to allow “[o]rphans, disabled children, or abandoned infants and children
whose parents cannot be ascertained or found and who are under the care of a
social welfare institution” to be adopted irrespective of whether the adopter is
childless,72 although the adopter must have reached the age of 30.73 People who
adopt children without permission or in contravention of the Adoption Law (for

69

Interview with founder and director of New Grace Foundation, a foreign-run foster
home outside of Beijing, in Beijing municipality (Sept. 17, 2009).
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Johnson et al., supra note 22, at 503.
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Crystal J. Gates, China’s Newly Enacted Intercountry Adoption Law: Friend or Foe?, 7
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 389 n.151 (1999) (noting that under the pre-1998
Adoption Law, “couples with children could only adopt orphans or children with special
needs”); Robert Gordon, The New Chinese Export: Orphaned Children – An Overview of
Adopting Children from China, 10 TRANSNAT’L LAW 121, 135 (1997) (noting, as of 1997,
the requirement that parents wishing to adopt an abandoned child from China be age 35 or
older, childless, and adopting only one child).
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Shouyang Fa (
) [Adoption Law], art. 8 (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1991, amended Nov. 4, 1988) 1998 China Law LEXIS 990;
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Adoption Law, supra note 72, art. 6 (stipulating that adopters shall have reached the age
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example, people who already have a child), receive the same birth-planning
penalties as if they had given birth to them.74
Johnson’s study does not delve deeply into whether similar patterns of
norms and cultural beliefs hold true for disabled children, given that most of the
adopted children in her sample were healthy. The anecdotal evidence from the
current study, which dealt primarily with non-governmental homes caring for
disabled or severely sick children, was that informal adoption is rarely an avenue
for non-healthy children, given the economic and cultural factors that contributed
to their abandonment in the first place. Zhou Xun, in a comprehensive study on the
lack of discourse on disability in modern China, notes that the low public visibility
of the disabled “is in itself an indication of social prejudice.”75 Many Chinese
interviewees with years of experience working with disabled children spoke of the
ridicule, shame, and economic hardship experienced by families with specialneeds children,76 all of which reduce an abandoned disabled child’s chances of
finding a new home, either informally or through legal adoption channels. Thus,
disability is a key indicator of both abandonment and institutionalization, with
abandoned disabled children ending up, for the most part, in state institutions with
high mortality rates or with grassroots private orphanages run without state
support.

D. Status of the (Chinese) Child
“Zhe shi zhongguo, haizi shi shehui de.”
“This is China, children belong to society.”77
They take an instrumental view of the value of a person. From a
materialistic, family-centered social view, they lack this Christian
perspective—that a person can have value beyond what he can do
or has. You see this problem in families—if you are not male, or

74
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105, 105 (2002).
76
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not 100% normal, the family goes through a very tough period—
they either fail and break up [the family], or reevaluate their life.78
Also relevant to a deeper understanding of formal and informal orphanrelated policies are Chinese conceptions of human rights and equality, and how
children are viewed therein. China engages extensively with the international
human rights framework,79 which is predicated on the rhetoric of every person’s
intrinsic, unassailable and equal right to dignity.80 However, the Chinese human
rights discourse remains bound up in a local culture and tradition which tends to
view children as valuable, first and foremost, for their instrumental role in the
family and social hierarchy, rather than viewing rights as contingent on one’s
intrinsic worth as an individual prior to society. Given the emphasis of both
Confucian and Communist ideologies on duty to society and the goal of social
harmony, it is unsurprising that the individualistic/atomistic framework of Western
human rights discourse is not the framework underlying rights conceptualizations
in China. The individual is, rather, conceptually embedded in, rather than prior to,
society, with duties in turn emphasized prior to rights. Frederic Wakeman writes,
“[M]ost Chinese citizens appear to conceive of social existence mainly in terms of
obligation and interdependence rather than rights and responsibilities.”81 When
one regards the “most basic level of Confucian morality,” that is, the strictly
hierarchical relationships between father and son, husband and wife, and older and
younger siblings,82 it is clear that equality of children with other members of
78

Interview with Charles Kramer, project manager, Guanghui, in Hebei (Jul. 9 2010)
(discussing his view of the Chinese basis of human rights and value).
79
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LIBR.,
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society is not a feature of the Confucian moral order. Rather, children are valued,
above all, for their potential to fulfill familial and concomitantly social duties.
This duty-based human rights ideology impacts the treatment of disabled
children in modern Chinese society. Studies focusing on gender as a cause of
abandonment often point to China’s patrilineal culture, in which women move
from their descent line into that of their husband after marriage and, as a result,
economically “females were seen as ‘temporary’ children who required a far
greater investment of scarce resources than they would ever be able to return to
their parents.”83 Analogous to this gender example is the disability example, in
which a child’s right to care and concern is outweighed by a discourse which
emphasizes that child’s inability to carry out his or her duties to family and
society. This discourse is influenced not only by cultural attitudes towards girls
and disabled children, but also by future social security needs of parents in a
society, which still largely relies on child-provided care of the elderly—the phrase
“filial piety” (yang’er fanglao) translates literally into “raising sons to prevent
difficulties in old age.”84 As Biying Hu and Judith Szente write, “[i]t seems that
the national emphasis on the Confucian acceptance of one’s social role in a
hierarchical society has placed people with disabilities on the bottom of that social
hierarchy.”85
Eleanor Holroyd explores the influence of Confucian cultural influences
on care-giving obligations towards children with disabilities, noting, “The primary
Confucian guidelines are a duty-bound set of obligations of what a ‘right and
proper’ person should and should not do. Being proper is central to the social role
within Confucian-based Chinese society.”86 Children, including disabled children,
who are seen as unable to carry out their “right and proper” obligations are
considered disturbances to family and, therefore, social harmony:
83
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Sociocultural Review, 22 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 288, 289 (2001) (discussing the
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[A]lthough a Confucian notion of a right and proper person is
associated with taking a moral place in the world, it is also about
how an imperfect or diseased body or mind is seen as incomplete
and without moral standing. This has the effect of challenging
foundational models of self and personhood and their translation
into ancestry, on which obligations rest. These violations are most
dramatically manifest in children with a handicap.87
Holroyd goes on to conclude:
Chinese children who have disabilities represent disruptions to the
flow of exchanges, in that giving good things to ill children might
not make life meaningful in the usual cultural sense understood by
a Chinese parent. Thus the ‘natural’ progression of patterns of
reciprocity that flow over into ancestry and birth is neither
immediate, in the forms of gratitude, nor generalized, in the form
of delayed care, with debts never able to be reclaimed.88
Matthew Kohrman moves beyond this instrumental connection between
disability and familial duty to describe a deeper, more intrinsic nexus between
disability and moral duty in traditional Chinese discourse.89 In his ethnographic
study of disability in modern China, he argues that the emphasis placed on visible
difference in modern China “can no doubt be linked to the emphasis that China’s
classical canon gives to the preservation of the human form”90:
Possibly the most oft-invoked example, in this regard, one which
has served as a moral axiom for centuries, is found in the Book of
Filial Piety. There, Confucius is described as teaching that all
children have the filial duty to preserve the body given them by
their ancestors and to not allow even their hair or skin to be
injured.91
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Negative cultural beliefs about, and attitudes towards, disability remain
evident in aspects of modern Chinese society—for example, in eugenics
campaigns “stressing the need for ‘fewer but better’ children,”92 and in the Law on
Maternal and Infant Health Care which requires doctors to discuss the termination
of fetuses found to have genetic diseases or defects of a “serious nature.”93
Leslie Wang argues that modern Chinese political discourse, with its
emphasis on the overall mental, moral, and physical “quality” (suzhi) of the
population, has resulted in “lines of stratification being drawn among offspring,”94
with healthy children considered more worthy of state and parental investment.
Sick or disabled children living in orphanages are considered “part of the
‘constitutive outside’ of state-sanctioned Chinese modernity, helping to define the
center of social belonging through the qualities that they are perceived to lack.”95
On the other hand, social and cultural attitudes towards, and meanings of,
“disability” continue to evolve, and it is overly simplistic to characterize modern
conceptions of disabled children as denigrative: “[c]anji [disability/disabled] has
been emerging and metamorphosing in China as a social, political, and somatic
sphere of existence in recent decades.”96 While it is neither possible nor wise to
speculate on the extent to which duty-based conceptualizations of children’s rights
has impacted abandonment and the care of orphans in China today, an awareness
of the different starting point to human rights discussions is necessary to consider
the system of orphan care more generally.

IV. POLICY ON CARE OF ORPHANS
A. Government Departments
Before examining the various statutory instruments and policies relevant
to orphanages, this article will outline the government structure and introduce the
various state authorities that have an interest in this area of regulation. Party and
government structures are organized in a roughly symmetrical fashion, under the
National Party Congress and the National People’s Congress (NPC) respectively,
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with the NPC being China’s “putative legislature.” 97 Frequently, legislative
functions and policy deliberations occur at the NPC Standing Committee and the
State Council (guowuyuan), the chief administrative authority of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), levels. The Ministry of Civil Affairs (minzhengbu) of
the PRC is subordinate to the State Council, and is responsible for “social and
administrative affairs,”98 including welfare programs for marginal groups, and is
complemented by MCA bureaus at both the provincial and local level. In addition
to the regulations and policies promulgated by the central MCA, provincial and
local MCA bureaus issue their own implementing regulations, which means that
the applicable regulatory framework may differ depending on one’s location.
Linda Wong’s study of the MCA, Marginalization and Social Welfare in China,
provides an overview of the issues confronting the MCA in fulfilling its goals, the
first of which is role ambiguity: “Its impossibly wide range of duties, their
disparate nature, and lack of coherence are not conducive to the emergence of
agency goals and mission.”99 She further argues that the local agency structure is
inadequate because at the bureaucracy’s weakest point, the township and village
levels, “where the majority of the rural masses are administered . . . the whole
range of civil affairs duty is usually handled by one to two civil affairs assistants,”
a manning structure Wong characterizes as “woefully deficient.”100 Furthermore,
MCA bureaus face financial struggles that are “unbroken tales in the long saga of
a half-starved organization.”101
Within the MCA bureaucracy are several departments and sub-bureaus,
the most relevant of which are the China Center of Adoption Affairs, 102 the
exclusive governmental adoption agency, and the Social Welfare and Charity
Promotion Division,103 which oversees the Child Welfare Agency.104 In addition to
its responsibility for foreign adoption issues, the Center of Adoption Affairs
oversees state orphanages. The Social Welfare and Charity Promotion Division is
mandated to develop social welfare policies and standards for the protection of
orphans, disabled children and other special groups.105
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B. Chinese Orphanages: The State Monopoly and Privately-filled
Gaps
Dr. Shang outlines the development of orphanages in China.106 Before
1949, orphanages across China were established by a variety of operators,
including local governments, individuals, churches, and charities. After the PRC
was founded in 1949, a transitional period ensued, during which some orphanages
were closed and some were “taken over by the new government and reorganized
as state orphanages.” 107 Today, “the government continues to monopolize the
operation of children’s welfare homes,” and the state system of orphan care is
“characterized by its rural-urban duality.”108 All orphaned and abandoned children
in China’s urban areas are eligible to be cared for by state orphanages, while those
in rural areas and children of long-term prisoners are not entitled to state
welfare.109 Further, due to increasing abandonment rates that are not matched by a
concomitant expansion of state orphanage capacity, existing orphanages are
overwhelmed and face heavy pressure in providing adequate care for urban
orphans. 110 As a result, and because the government has a monopoly on the
operation of children’s welfare homes, the vast majority of orphans (that is, those
residing in rural areas) are looked after either by relatives, the customary practice
of nongcun wubao, or in unregistered and unrecognized private orphanages.111
Johnson’s study on abandonment and adoption show that a large number
of orphans and foundlings are being informally adopted without registration (and,
therefore, usually without hukou),112 a phenomenon that is closely related to the
emergence of private and informal orphanages. As Human Rights Watch notes:
[T]he whereabouts of the great majority of China’s orphans [is]
still [] a complete mystery, leaving crucial questions about the
country’s child welfare system unanswered and suggesting that
the real scope of the catastrophe that has befallen China’s
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unwanted children may be far larger than the evidence . . .
documents.113
Dr. Shang’s survey found 66,000 of an estimated 573,000 orphans are in
state welfare institutes.114 The most recent government report puts the figure at
87,000;115 however, only 70% of those children are in specialized child welfare
institutes (ertong fuliyuan; as of 2011, there were 397 child welfare institutes in
China).116 The remaining 30% reside alongside disabled, elderly, and mentally
disturbed adults in the more general social welfare institutes (shehui fuliyuan), but
it is unclear what proportion of these children are themselves mentally or
physically unwell.117
Orphanages and foster homes run by individuals and churches are an
alternative, parallel, and often unacknowledged system of care to the stateoperated welfare institutions. Although a small proportion of China’s orphans and
foundlings are cared for in state orphanages, there are no official statistics or
estimates on the number of non-government orphanages in existence in China
today, by whom they are run, or for how many children they care. Yet, these
private orphanages are anecdotally prolific, and form an important aspect of
orphan care to which little attention has been paid in existing scholarship.118
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/15/chinese-officials-borrow-orphans-failings
(reporting on a local government orphanage which was being used for office space, despite
receiving state funding).
117
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 40, at 120 (“[T]he ‘segregated management’
orphan-care policy which the government has claimed to pursue since 1956 . . . has only
rarely [been] achieved in practice.”).
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See also Anna Jane High, Grassroots NGO Regulation and China’s Local Legal
Culture, 9 SOCIO-LEGAL REV. (2013) (forthcoming) (discussing the state-society
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C. Orphanage Law and Policy
When Alain and Brigitte established their foster home for blind and
visually impaired orphans, they named it Good News Foster Home.119 However,
presumably uneasy at the attention that this name drew to Alain’s vision and
mission, various Chinese officials and authorities discouraged them from using the
phrase “foster home” because “it’s illegal for foreigners to foster Chinese
children.”120 I asked Alain to explain this emphasis on appearances and names
rather than on the actual work of Good News, of which authorities were already
aware, and had allowed for many years:
When we speak to officials, they don’t give you the feeling that
you’re doing something illegal—actually they’re pretty
encouraging at that central level. They’re quite visionary people at
the top. But they tell us we need to speak to the guy downstairs,
and that’s where the problems start. The middle guys are not in it
for the kids. So the top guys tell us to take it slowly, that it takes
time. They don’t want to tell us what to do—they wouldn’t tell us
to do something illegal–rather they keep it blurry. It’s not clear.
They don’t tell you to leave, but they don’t tell you how to stay.
Good News’ experience is typical of the private orphanages and foster
homes interviewed, which find themselves working in a field the legality of which
is ambiguous at best. Dr. Shang writes that, based on an interview with an official
from the MCA, central policy stipulates that only state-run welfare institutions
may lawfully care for orphaned and abandoned children in China.121 However,
making such a broad statement is problematic: “government” is a cumbersome
entity in China that does not always present a unified front. Certainly, both the
Chinese nationals and foreigners running the private orphanages interviewed
stated that local and provincial level officials frequently refer to their operations as
“illegal” or “not allowed,” usually on the basis of an assertion that only the
government can care for Chinese orphans. The one state orphanage director who
interaction between Chinese private orphanages and local authorities, and attendant local
understandings of law and regulation).
119
Interview with Alain & Brigitte, founders and directors of Good News Training Center
(formerly Good News Foster Home), in Beijing (Aug. 20, 2010).
120
Id.
121
Shang et al., Welfare Provision, supra note 4, at 125.
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was willing to be interviewed denied knowledge of any foreign-run foster homes,
despite the fact that other foster homes interviewed were caring for dozens of
children from his facility.122
The political engagement and sensitivity of both abandonment and child
welfare are key issues in any discussion of orphanage policies. Shang argues that,
due to the government’s monopoly on residential orphan care, maintenance and
development of the state’s orphanage sector was dependent on government
appropriation, which was in turn dependent on national financial and political
considerations rather than the interests of orphans.123 She explains:
During this time, the situation of orphans became a kind of
political symbol: either it was regarded as a manifestation of socalled socialist advantages or as something that brought shame to
the socialist society when things were going wrong. The interests
of children themselves, however, were hidden from view by
political considerations. Efforts to seek other financial resources,
such as appealing to society for donations, were implicitly or
explicitly banned for political reasons.124
The issue of state versus non-state orphan care is understandably a
politically sensitive one, and the state is especially sensitive about foreign and
church-affiliated service providers. Consequently, opacity, ambiguity, and
inconsistency in relevant government policies and laws are expected and evident.
In central-level statutory and subordinate instruments, there is one
reference to the care of orphans under Article 43 of the Law on the Protection of
Minors,125 which provides, inter alia, that orphaned and abandoned children shall
be accepted by and cared for by orphanages established by MCA departments.126
This is the only on-point legislative guidance, and it can be read as a duty
exclusively bestowed upon the government. However, there are several policytype instruments that exist in relation to orphan welfare, which, given the blurred
122

Interview with Hedong City State Welfare Institute, in Shandong (Sep. 21, 2009).
Shang, Better Way, supra note 11, at 206.
124
Id.
125
Weicheng Nianren Baohu Fa (
) [Law on the Protection of Minors], art.
43 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Of the People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1991, revised
Dec. 29, 2006, effective June 1, 2007) 2006 China Law LEXIS 9895.
126
The Law on the Protection of Minors also includes a general and idealized duty on the
state and other citizens to protect minors. Id. art. 6 (“The State, society, schools and
families shall teach and help minors to safeguard their legitimate rights and interests,
enhance their consciousness and capacities of protecting themselves, and enhance their
sense of social responsibility.”).
123
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boundaries in China between legislation (“hard” law) and policy (“soft” law), may
bear significantly on the “legal” landscape. For example, the more recent Joint
Ministerial Opinion on Strengthening Orphan Relief appears more open to
collaborative efforts with civil society with respect to the care of orphans.127 The
Opinion is one of several policy documents that were issued in the flurry of
bureaucratic activity that occurred between 2006 and 2007 in conjunction with the
Blue Sky Implementation Plan.128 Part 2.3 of the Opinion stipulates that orphans in
the guardianship of the MCA may be placed in community orphan welfare homes,
orphan schools, SOS Children’s Villages, 129 and other such organizations. In
addition, the Opinion refers to the mobilization of social forces to assist orphans,
and the need to encourage civil society and other social forces to support
participation in child welfare and orphan assistance projects. 130 The express
reference to SOS Children’s Villages by name, and the absence of any reference to
other foreign foster homes, may be interpreted as meaning the Opinion only
contemplates allowing this particular foreign-led effort to play a role in the sector.
More directly on point are the Interim Measures for the Management of
Fostering Care by Families (Fostering Care Measures), 131 and the Interim
Measures for the Administration of Social Welfare Institutions.132 The former
allow for orphaned children to be placed with foster families,133 coordinated by
127

STRENGTHENING ORPHAN RELIEF, supra note 10.
See MINZHENGBU YINFA (
) [MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS], MINZHENGBU YINFA
“ERTONG FULI JIGOU JIANSHE LANTIAN JIHUA” SHISHI FANG’AN (
) [CHILD WELFARE INSTITUTE BLUE SKY
CONSTRUCTION
PLAN
IMPLEMENTATION
PROGRAM]
(Feb.
1,
2007),
http://fss.mca.gov.cn/article/gzdt/200711/20071100003905.shtml (explaining the Blue Sky
Implementation Plan); see also infra note 172.
129
SOS Children’s Villages are set up under a long-term MCA project, in cooperation with
an Austrian charity that establishes privately funded foster homes. For more information
on SOS Children’s Villages, see About our Charity,
SOS CHILDREN,
http://www.soschildrensvillages.org.uk/about-our-charity.
130
STRENGTHENING ORPHAN RELIEF, supra note 10, at 1, 5.
131
Jiating Jiyang Guanli Zanxing Banfa (
) [Interim Measures for
the Management of Fostering Care by Families], (adopted by the Ministry of Civil Affairs,
Oct.
27,
2003,
effective
Jan.
1,
2004),
available
at
http://sxxincheng.mca.gov.cn/article/zcwj/201303/20130300430773.shtml.
132
Shehui Fuli Jigou Guanli Zanxing Banfa (
) [Interim
Measures for the Administration of Social Welfare Institutions], art. 11 (adopted by the
Ministry
of
Civil
Affairs,
Dec.
30,
1999),
available
at
http://sxxincheng.mca.gov.cn/article/zcwj/201303/20130300431147.shtml.
133
For a discussion of the increased focus of MCA policy on foster families to supplement
institutional care, see Shang, Better Way, supra note 11.
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provincial-level MCA bureaus in conjunction with approved social welfare
institutions (shehui fuli jigou) and child welfare institutions (ertong fuli jigou).
However, the Fostering Care Measures do not appear to contemplate moving
children from state orphanages to private foster homes because they only refer to
foster families; further, while foreigners are not prima facie precluded from
fostering in their individual capacity, anecdotally this has not met with state
approval.134 A number of the private orphanages interviewed coordinate foster
family programs under which healthier children are sent to live with preapproved
local Chinese families. Chapter IV of the Fostering Care Measures refers to “social
welfare institutions engaged in foster family work”;135 however, county level or
higher MCA bureaus must approve such institutions.
The Interim Measures for the Administration of Social Welfare
Institutions (Social Welfare Measures) were promulgated by the central MCA in
1999 to “strengthen the management of social welfare organizations and thereby
promote the healthy development of social welfare.” 136 “Social welfare
organization” is defined to include groups organized by state welfare agencies,
social organizations, and individuals that provide maintenance, rehabilitation and
trustee-type services to orphans and abandoned children.137 In theory, the Social
Welfare Measures thus seem to allow private homes to care for children. However,
to be lawfully established under these Measures, all homes (whether run by state
welfare agencies, social organizations or individuals) must be granted a Social
Welfare Institution Certificate of Approval in accordance with the Measures.138
Importantly, the Social Welfare Measures reference foreigners applying for
permission to establish such an organization. 139 These Measures also contain
provisions relating to internal governance and MCA supervision of social welfare
institutions, 140 and require local and provincial level governments to set and
implement standards. 141 Of the private orphanages interviewed, only one was
aware of any legislative or policy instruments allowing NGOs to obtain official
134

Three of the interviewees, mainly volunteer coordinators working with state
orphanages, have been able, after a number of years developing personal relationships with
state orphanage directors, to foster babies or children in extenuating circumstances. These
arrangements are always unofficial and “off the books.” Indeed this is usually how the
larger, established foreign-run private orphanages begin operations (see below).
135
Interim Measures for the Administration of Social Welfare Institutions, supra note 132,
art. 11.
136
Id. art. 1.
137
Id. art. 2.
138
Id. art. 11.
139
Id. art. 8.
140
Id. art. 5.
141
Id. art. 9, s. 3.
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permission to care for orphans; however, as the founder of Red Thread pointed
out, the Social Welfare Measures are of little use for start-up foster homes because
they require an applicant to demonstrate adequate funding, facilities, and premises,
which impoverished, domestic-run, private orphanages are unable to do. 142
Further, because these Measures prohibit welfare organizations from operating
without an approval certificate,143 it may be risky for long-established, foreign-run,
private orphanages to seek approval following years of unauthorized operations.
The state orphanage director interviewed did allude to a government
policy enabling private citizens to apply for government permission to establish
foster homes—most likely a reference to the Interim Measures for the
Administration of Social Welfare Institutions. However, he was also clear that the
government looks unfavorably on such enterprises, and the practice of caring for
orphans outside the state orphanage system is not encouraged, at least in his
province. In any case, the language in the Measures seems permissive rather than
mandatory – there is no duty, on the MCA to approve applications for a Social
Welfare Institution Certificate of Approval that meet the criteria.
The Adoption Law144 and the Protection of Disabled Persons Law145 are
peripherally relevant to the care of orphans. Article 5 of the Adoption Law
provides that the following citizens or institutions are entitled to place children
into adoption: guardians of orphans, social welfare institutions, and parents who
are unable to rear their children due to unusual circumstances.146 “Social welfare
institution” (shehui fuli jigou) is not defined, but generally is used by the MCA to
refer only to state-run institutions.147 Article 17 provides that relatives or friends of
their parents may support orphans or children whose parents are unable to rear

142

Id. art. 8; see also interview with retired MCA official, in Beijing (Aug. 12, 2010)
(stating that private citizens can get approval to run an orphanage, but that the process is
costly).
143
Shehui Fuli Jigou Guanli Zanxing Banfa (
) [Interim
Measures for the Administration of Social Welfare Institutions] art. 28 (adopted by the
Ministry of Civil Affairs, Dec. 30, 1999).
144
Shouyang Fa (
) [Adoption Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1991, amended Nov. 4, 1988) 1998 China Law LEXIS 990.
145
Canjiren Baozhang Fa (
) [Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 1990, effective May
15, 1991) 1990-1992 FALÜ QUANSHU 1268 (China), translated in 14 P.R.C. LAWS & REGS
V-03-00-101 (“Maltreatment and abandoning of disabled persons shall be prohibited.”).
146
Adoption Law, supra note 144, art. 5.
147
See, e.g., Social Services Statistics Quarterly Report, supra note 115, and 2011
Statistical Bulletin, supra note 116.
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them, and the adoptive relationship shall not apply in this case.148 Article 21
provides that foreigners may adopt a child in China only in accordance with the
Adoption Law of the PRC.149 Article 7 of the Protection of Disabled Persons Law
provides that grassroots-level organizations (inter alia) “shall do their work for the
disabled well, as is within their responsibility.”150 Article 9 requires legal fosterers
of disabled persons to fulfill their duties toward their charges. 151 Article 43
provides that governments at various levels and the society shall establish welfare
centers and other placement and foster institutions for disabled persons.152

V. STATE ORPHANAGES
In 1995, Britain’s Channel 4 broadcast a documentary on China’s
orphanages titled The Dying Rooms: China’s Darkest Secret, which was shortly
followed by publication of Human Rights Watch/Asia’s investigation, Death by
Default: A Policy of Fatal Neglect in China’s State Orphanages.153 The report was
a stunning, albeit arguably sensationalized, indictment of the conditions in state
orphanages across China, including what was, at the time, touted as the country’s
model orphanage—the Shanghai Children’s Welfare Institute (CWI). Johnson
states that orphanages are disadvantaged places in general, and that
institutionalized care for infants is linked with high mortality rates in many
countries.154 However, the Human Rights Watch report went further. The report
was based on documented evidence of systematic abuse in the Shanghai CWI and
the 1989-1990 orphanage mortality rates published by Chinese MCA authorities
for several provinces, which were between fifty and eighty percent.155 It concludes
that a “pattern of cruelty, abuse, and malign neglect [] has dominated child welfare
work in China since the early 1950s, and [] now constitutes one of the country’s
gravest human rights problems.”156
Based largely on official MCA documents, as well as reports from two
whistleblowers (a former doctor and a former resident of the Shanghai CWI),
Death By Default calculates that, for a newly admitted orphan in China’s welfare
institutions nationwide, the likelihood of survival beyond one year was less than
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Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons, supra note 145, art. 7.
151
Id. art. 9.
152
Id. art. 43.
153
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 40, at 173.
154
Johnson et al., supra note 22, 469.
155
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 40, at 2.
156
Id. at 1.
149

2013]

CHINA’S ORPHAN WELFARE SYSTEM

157

fifty percent in 1989.157 At the Shanghai CWI, the total mortality of orphans in the
late 1980s and early 1990s was estimated at ninety percent.158 The Human Rights
Watch report also documents medical records and testimony, which evidence a
pervasive practice of “summary resolution”—the selection of “unwanted infants
and children for death by intentional deprivation of food and water.”159
On the basis of documents published by the Chinese authorities
themselves, Human Rights Watch/Asia has established that the
People’s Republic has not, at any time since its foundation,
attempted to provide adequate care for orphans and other
dependent groups, such as the handicapped, the destitute elderly,
and the mentally disabled. . . . For the majority of abandoned
children in China today, the state’s policy of malign neglect means
an early and lingering death.160
The report goes on to explain:
China’s urban orphanages and other institutions for children serve
a largely symbolic function, representing the state’s public
commitment to the humane treatment of abandoned infants but in
practice making almost no effort to keep them alive.161
International response to the Human Rights Watch report was immediate
and grave. However, the report should be treated with caution, given that
inferences about deliberate, policy-based abuse and “summary resolution” are
drawn based on evidence from one orphanage. Johnson rejects the report’s
“sweeping thesis” of routine murder across China through deliberate starvation,162
arguing that, while the high mortality rates in orphanages across China in the early
1990s were documented by local officials and Chinese government statistics,163 the
explanation for these alarming rates involves many factors, of which “most [were]
beyond the control of the orphanage staff.”164
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In the years since the publication of Death by Default, many scholars and
researchers have reported excellent progress made in China’s state orphanages,
including increased funding from international NGOs and foreign adoption
agencies.165 Shang cites a number of MCA policies and documents promulgated
since the 1990s, which demonstrate that “the Chinese government has been
actively seeking proper ways to protect orphaned or abandoned children,” a
process that “has clearly accelerated since 1998.”166 Johnson’s research suggests
that, “By the end of the 1990s orphanage conditions had improved dramatically in
many places thanks to increased government funding, funds generated by
international adoption, and increasing participation by international charitable
organizations.”167 However, comments the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child has made as recently as 2005 indicate that progress is still required to ensure
that all deaths of children in state institutions are “properly documented and
investigated, and that appropriate follow-up actions are taken when necessary,”168
as well as ensuring that “all forms of alternative care meet quality standards in
conformity with the Convention.”169
Many interviewees with first-hand experience of conditions in state
orphanages spoke of dire conditions, inadequate care and medical treatment, and,
in some cases, the continuance of “summary resolution.”170 Others emphasized
that the institutions with which they cooperate are making genuine efforts to help
their wards, and that much progress has been made.171 However, it is impossible to
make generalizations about the conditions in China’s state orphanages. At most,
there appears to be a large disparity in the conditions and levels of care in
orphanages across China, with much depending on the particular institution’s
director and financial position (most orphanage funding is local rather than
central). Further, the legacy of Western “exposés” of Chinese orphanage
conditions in the mid-1990s, such as Death by Default, has endured to the present
day. Despite improvements across the various, diverse orphanages, “the shocking
images of ‘dying rooms’ have not been replaced with more current representations
165

Catherine Keyser, The Role of the State and NGOs in Caring for At-risk Children: The
Case of Orphan Care, in STATE AND SOCIETY: RESPONSES TO SOCIAL WELFARE NEEDS IN
CHINA 45, 60 (Jonathan Schwartz & Shawn Shieh eds., 2009).
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See, e.g., Interview with David Dale, founder, New Grace Foundation, in Beijing
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24, 2009).
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of Chinese institutional care and thus remain entrenched in the international social
imaginary.”172
The Chinese government has not been unresponsive to the welfare needs
of its orphaned and abandoned children. Johnson points to policy measures that
were put in place before publication of the Human Rights Watch report to improve
orphanage conditions, including increased recourse to international adoption and
cooperation with international charities.173 More recently, in June 2006, President
Hu Jintao, during a visit to a state orphanage, called for all children to be able to
develop equally under the same blue sky, with orphans benefiting from the same
opportunities as other children.174 In response, and as a means of implementing
Hu’s call, the MCA issued the Blue Sky Implementation Plan.175 The five-year
program, which commenced in 2006, aimed to invest central and local government
funding in the construction of new state orphanages and in the improvement of
existing state orphanages. The program set per capita construction targets, and
provided for the corresponding government subsidization of state orphanages. The
ministry allocated 200 million RMB annually to building welfare institutions in
each prefecture-level city across China.176 Four interviewees expressed skepticism
about the value of the Blue Sky Plan, which was focused on institutional rather
than family-based care, because some children reportedly were being removed
from family-based foster care to fill the newly built orphanages. A similar orphantargeted central policy was the Tomorrow Plan, launched in 2004, which was
intended to benefit orphans with disabilities by providing free treatment or surgical
rehabilitation to 35,000 children in state institutions.177

VI. PRIVATE ORPHANAGES
The private orphanage sector includes both grassroots Chinese-run
orphanages, which care for children surrendered directly into their care, and foster
homes, which are run mostly by foreign mission workers and care for children
fostered from state institutions for short- or long-term treatment and guardianship.
These non-government homes are, for the most part, operating without formally
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registering as charitable organizations or welfare homes, without legal standing,
and without any kind of formal state regulation or oversight.

A. Grassroots Chinese-run Private Orphanages
The situation of grassroots, unregistered, private Chinese orphanages has
not been studied from a legal perspective: the most comprehensive English study
is by Dr. Xiaoyuan Shang. In Welfare Provision for Vulnerable Children: The
Missing Role of the State, Shang and her colleagues examine the situation of
grassroots, non-state, Chinese-run orphanages based on field interviews in China,
using Guanghui as a case study. 178 Such homes typically are established
spontaneously and from necessity, and in rural areas, when children are abandoned
into the care of known Christians or do-gooders due to the shortage of accessible
state orphanages or other welfare initiatives. Gradual expansion occurs as these
homes come to be viewed by local residents and police as de facto orphanages;
however, according to Shang’s study, such grassroots orphanages are routinely
denied formal state recognition as welfare institutions.179
This article’s survey of Chinese-run private orphanages included both
unregistered organizations operating independently of state authorities, and
previously independent orphanages that have secured working partnerships with
government bureaus. In 2010, I spent several weeks at Guanghui and Our Lady’s
Home for the Handicapped, both of which are homes for orphans and foundlings
run by nuns of the unofficial Catholic Church, in order to better understand the
day-to-day life and experiences of resident children and sisters. In addition, I
conducted in-depth interviews with representatives of five other private, Chineserun orphanages. Four of these orphanages (including one that is no longer in
operation) are or were associated with underground churches. The remaining
surveyed homes are not connected with religious communities.
The fieldwork shows that informal orphanage operations are abundant in
the provinces visited, and constitute grassroots efforts to fill actual or perceived
gaps in the state’s provision of welfare.180 Each interviewee from the seven private
178

Id. at 1.
Id. at 130-131 (describing Guanghui’s unsuccessful attempts to gain legal status), 132
(“It is beyond the power of the local authority to give a formal registration to any of the
[non-governmental children’s welfare institutions] in its province. According to the law, it
is illegal for NGOs to run children’s welfare homes.”).
180
Whether the existence of such open and accessible local initiatives is itself impacting on
the incidence of abandonment in rural areas is an important question, beyond the scope of
this study. Hu and Szente refer to the concern of state orphanage directors that increased
media attention has led to an increased in instances of abandonment within her district, a
179
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orphanage case studies listed at least three other private orphanages in their
respective provinces of which they were aware, despite the fact that networks of
mutual support among the homes appeared weak to non-existent. 181 I also
interviewed two Western individuals, Father Thomas and Charles Kramer, who
are full-time advocates for the Catholic private orphanages, working to enhance
their administrative capabilities and fundraising power. Both estimate that there
are dozens of private homes in the northern provinces surrounding Beijing alone,
and probably hundreds across China. A large number of such orphanages are
operated by or in close affiliation with “underground” or unofficial churches.
Based on the grassroots orphanages observed and reported in the field,
such homes tend to arise in response to local need and gaps in state-provided
welfare. Where state orphanages admit their resident children through official
channels, the private orphanages are often founded out of necessity, following the
discovery of abandoned children in a particular region. This was the case for all
three Catholic orphanages that were interviewed, and is typical of such homes. It is
common for abandoning parents to leave their children near church buildings, or
for children found in public spaces to be brought to known Christians in the area,
in the absence of state-provided alternatives. Over time, large numbers of
foundlings come to be cared for by overwhelmed parishioners, before they are
brought together under the supervision of church leaders for central care.
Other orphanages are established as a planned response to a perceived
need in a community, and become, over time and as word spreads, regular
recipients of abandoned children or, in the case of Star Village, children of
prisoners who have no other caregivers. Harriet Blake, a volunteer coordinator for
one of the non-church orphanages, described the different motives behind the
running of the Yangtze Orphanage, another case study. A Chinese man established
the home, which currently cares for twenty-seven children. She related disturbing
examples of his use of the children to fundraise from international donors, and the
total lack of accountability and transparency regarding the use of such funds,
which Harriet does not believe ever reach the children—she has since ended her
concern also reported by directors in Johnson’s studies. Hu & Szente, supra note 85, at 13;
JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 13; see also Holroyd, supra note 86, at 18 (discussing whether
abandonment is more culturally acceptable in China where there exists “the social certainty
that one’s kin are likely to feel morally obliged to take up this care”). Sister Qin of
Guanghui Catholic Orphanage reported lower abandonment rates once she had put posters
up requesting no more children be brought to Guanghui. The fate of children who may
otherwise have been abandoned at Guanghui is, of course, unknown. Interview with Sister
Qin, supra note 53.
181
It is possible that a high level of activity is observable in certain provinces due to a
correspondingly high Catholic or Protestant population.
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association with the orphanage.182 Examples of such corrupt private orphanages
raise worrying questions about the potential abuse and neglect of children
occurring in the sector.
There are several reasons why children at private orphanages do not end
up being cared for by the state welfare system. Many rural areas are prohibitively
distant from the nearest state orphanage, most of which are in urban locations and
theoretically only service urban populations. Children of prisoners are not eligible
for care by welfare institutes. Shang notes that while “theoretically, the state is the
sole welfare provider to vulnerable children in China,” at the same time state
policy in rural areas is “not to take direct responsibility for supporting [vulnerable]
children” where such children are theoretically cared for by “traditional family and
kinship networks, and wubao [guaranteed food, clothing, fuel, healthcare, and
education or funeral arrangements].”183 However, reality in rural areas does not
always reflect the theory of central policies. Shang explains that, while many rural
orphaned children are protected by wubao, there are deficiencies that render the
system ineffective and inadequate as a means of care. First, in a community-based
social system, children who are moved away from their birthplace tend not to
benefit from the networks necessary for access, and are disentitled to wubao.
Affected by this are abandoned children of unknown parentage and, thus,
unknown identity and birthplace. Second, children cared for by their grandparents
are similarly disentitled. Due to the widespread impoverishment and attendant
vulnerability of the rural elderly as a social group,184 this lack of financial support
for extended kinship networks caring for true orphans or abandoned children is
problematic and contributes to the incidence of abandonment. Third, children of
long-term prisoners are not entitled to wubao.185 Finally, Shang notes:
[e]ven where the formal system is applicable, it may not work in
poorer areas. Previous research suggests that the current system of
child protection provided by the government has been placed
under huge financial pressure during the economic reforms. The
financial base of wubao has been weakened during the process of
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de-collectivization and rural taxation reforms. The wubao system
itself is becoming increasingly unreliable. Given the situation,
even if children are entitled to social welfare benefits, they still
may not be able to receive them owing to the financial difficulties
facing local governments and communities.186
For these reasons, kinship and wubao networks are unable to protect
vulnerable rural children. Therefore, and in the absence of rural state institutions,
grassroots private orphanages have evolved to address such inadequacies.
Several sisters interviewed believe that, even when a state orphanage is
within reach, some abandoning parents are reluctant to leave their children at such
institutions out of fear of being caught and sanctioned for the crime of
abandonment. Although, as noted above, punishment for the crime of
abandonment is relatively rare, the fines potentially imposed in cases of
prosecution are, at least anecdotally, high enough to deter many rural would-be
abandoning parents. In addition, there is a perception among abandoning parents
that children surrendered into the state’s care will disappear into the system. In
contrast, by leaving one’s child at a local church or private orphanage, it is often
possible for parents to watch from afar—most orphanages could relate incidences
of parents who had a change of heart and came back for their child. Other
abandoning parents will make a habit of leaving donations at the orphanage gates,
even though they may be unwilling or unable to visit their children overtly.
My interviews with the case-study private orphanages included an analysis
of the implications of the lack of state registration and formal oversight as they
relate to the inadequacy of welfare protection for orphans. One of the case study
homes, Rainbow House, after years of operating quasi-legally and without
registration, was able to obtain MCA approval for its operations, and Star Village
is registered as a commercial entity. The remaining homes all continue to operate
unregistered. Shang’s study of Guanghui and other grassroots Catholic orphanages
also explored some of the implications of the lack of state registration, and her
findings mirror those of this study. First, private orphanages generally are unable
to obtain registration or legal standing, which means that, in addition to causing
difficulties with banking, leasing and other operational matters, the children in
their care often do not have a hukou. Without a hukou, one does not have legal
status and, therefore, cannot access many basic rights of citizenship, such as state
welfare (including wubao) or medical care. Government initiatives directed at
orphans, such as The Tomorrow Plan,187 have no way of reaching children with no
186
187
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legal identity. Such children are also not able to be listed for international adoption
with the China Center of Adoption Affairs. Although domestic adoptions for
unregistered children have on occasion been arranged when a willing family has
been located by the private orphanage itself, such arrangements are informal and
not subject to state supervision, giving rise to the potential for misuse, and do not
address the other problems stemming from a lack of hukou. A hukou is also in
theory required to attend schools, although some interviewees reported that they
were able, in relation to at least primary school-aged children, to negotiate their
admission to local schools based on good relationships (guanxi) with local
teachers. The problem of unregistered children is not an unfamiliar one in China:
“In 1988 the Public Security Bureau estimated that there were approximately one
million [such] children.”188 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has also
expressed concern about the lack of registration of unknown numbers of Chinese
children.189 The lack of redress for non-registered children who are residents of
unregistered orphanages results in a further stratification of orphans, analogous to
the stratification of disabled persons discussed above, with hukou-less orphans
subject to adoption, schooling, and medical care outcomes that are less favorable
than those of registered orphans.
Second, orphanages housing unregistered children are not eligible for
government fiscal assistance or other benefits. All Chinese private homes
interviewed were frustrated by their inability to obtain official not-for-profit status,
since most believed that having legal recognition as a child-related welfare
institute would entitle them to government funding, or at least bolster the
legitimacy of their repeated appeals to various departments for assistance. Further,
as non-registered entities, the private orphanages are legally prohibited from
publicly soliciting donations,190 and are unable to issue official receipts (fapiao) to
donors for tax deductions. On a related note, Ashley and He argue that a lack of
registration as an NGO impacts on the ability of grassroots charities to fundraise
internationally, because “foreign foundations often require that the programs to
which they distribute funds be recognized as nonprofit organizations under their
home country’s domestic laws.” 191 The situation means that local private
orphanages must rely almost entirely on petty cash donations from the local
community (which is inevitably very poor due to the mostly rural locations of
188
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these orphanages), and are unable to solicit corporate sponsorship directly.
Moreover, lacking an official, not-for-profit status hinders their ability to solicit
domestic donations because, in China, the social legitimacy of NGOs is partly a
function of proximity to, and recognition by, the state.192
Third, as non-entities that operate outside the state system, private
orphanages are not subject to the regulation and standardization of orphan
services, nor are they provided with technical or policy support (other than by
volunteers and NGOs). Safeguards against substandard provision of care for
orphans are ineffective for unregistered grassroots orphanages, which operate
outside of the formal legal framework for NGOs generally and child welfare
institutions specifically. Accordingly, formal supervision of internal governance,
financial management and care practices is lacking. Ashley and He make the same
point about Chinese NGOs generally: “[the government’s approach to regulation]
creates a supervision gap that could lead to messy accounting and internal
governance, further undermining both governmental and public trust in these
organizations.”193 This supervision and policy gap was not a concern raised by any
of the Chinese interviewees, except on occasion in relation to access to training, or
in relation to other organizations. All in all, the Chinese orphanage operators
seemed to regard self-regulation as optimal, and regulation as superfluous, given
the perceived inscrutable motives of those involved in the sector. Of course, the
presumption that those who are willing to take on the burdens and difficulties with
establishing such homes are necessarily acting out of benevolence rather than selfinterest is, anecdotally, fallible. Further, given the lack of expertise of even the
most benevolent orphanage operators, on the one hand, and the unknown fate of
children were such orphanages not in operation, on the other, it is difficult, with
regards to much of the work taking place in the field, to know whether to
characterize it as helpful or harmful. Nonetheless, most interviewees expressed
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concerns that increasing regulation of the industry would impinge on the scope of
their work, it being “easier to do things if nobody knows you’re doing them.”194

B. Foreign-run Foster Homes
The co-existence of state and private homes for orphans comes into
sharper focus as the study turns now to the orphan services provided by foreign
workers in China. After the PRC was founded, all foreign-run missionary
orphanages across China were either closed or taken over as state orphanages.195
Today, many foreigners have embraced a new, collaborative model of orphan care
in response to personal callings to assist the Chinese government and society in
their care of vulnerable children. The foster home model, first pioneered in the
1990s by the founders of Prince of Peace, has spread through major municipalities
and their surrounding townships in the past decade. Under this model, government
orphanages make arrangements to move children to more institutional-type foster
homes, most of which are run by foreigners. The term “foster home” is used herein
to describe organizations that provide family-style care to orphans who were
previously residents of state orphanages on a temporary or long-term basis. The
children are provided with medical intervention and rehabilitation, and then reside
at the foster home, or with local foster families under the foster home’s
supervision, until an adoption can be arranged through the central authorities. If an
adoption match is not made, children often end up being cared for by the foster
home on a permanent basis. As a result, a pressing issue faced by many of the
homes is how to avoid becoming a hospice or an elderly home as their
unadoptable children enter early adulthood. Such homes, almost exclusively
located in urban areas, range from small-scale operations in which a small number
of children are cared for by a “mother” and “father,” to large, institution-based
foster care services provided for hundreds of children, with high caregiver to child
ratios and an emphasis on emulating a family environment. Many homes have
expertise in providing care for a particular condition or type of surgery.
While Chinese grassroots orphanages have received some attention in
sociological studies, this is the first study to include an in-depth overview of
foreign foster homes’ growth, development, and scope of operations. Two
previous studies have touched upon the role of foreign NGOs in caring for
orphaned and abandoned children, and provide important contextual information
and ethnographic insights into the social sphere of the foreign foster homes.
Catherine Keyser’s overview of state and non-state actors that care for Chinese
194
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orphans introduces three high-profile foreign NGOs working closely with the
MCA and state orphanages. Two of these are included in the current study. Keyser
also references the lower-profile, unregistered foreign organizations providing
foster care directly, which constitute the bulk of foreign charity organizations
working with children in China.196 Her work touches on the difficulties faced by
lower-profile foster homes due to their lack of registration, and the ongoing
political tension over how such foreign NGOs should be registered and monitored.
Leslie Wang’s doctoral thesis, The Global Politics of Orphanage Care in
China, is a comprehensive analysis of the treatment of children in the state
orphanage system, and focuses on the process of “transnational negotiation” that
occurs where foreigners seek to collaborate with state orphanages, including
through in-house services and foster home arrangements. Wang argues that
partnerships between foreigners and state orphanages are “taking place on
constantly shifting political terrain and often move forward with unchecked
momentum or run up against unforeseen difficulties and collapse altogether,”
rendering them highly unstable, and leading Wang to question the limits of such
transnational collaboration as China continues to globalize. 197 This “shifting
political terrain” is referred to also by Keyser, who argues that “political,
bureaucratic, and financial constraints hamper the legalization of both
[international] NGOs and domestic NGOs as full players in welfare provision for
orphans,” the political constraint being “tension over how, and under what
circumstances, [international NGOs] can be registered.”198 Keyser also points out
that, while the ambiguous legality of foreign NGOs causes difficulties, “the very
vagueness in the law on the protection of children as well as the ability to operate
at the local level has also created opportunities,”199 apparently avoiding a lawcentric presumption that an ambiguous regulatory environment is inherently
problematic or unstable.
While foreign foster homes are less prolific than private orphanages, they
are generally located in or near major municipalities, either in rented urban
apartment complexes or more expansive properties in satellite villages and towns.
Further, the histories of many of the homes are intertwined, with managers and
staff commonly leaving one home to establish a foster home targeting a different
and particular group of special needs children, which adds to the informal network
of foreigners involved in orphan care in China and, especially, in the Beijing area.
As a result, most home managers were contacted through introductions arranged
by other foster homes, and it was possible to access more foster home case studies
196
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than Chinese private orphanage case studies. In-depth and follow-up interviews
were conducted at sixteen foster homes during the summers of 2009 and 2010. I
spent up to several weeks living at a Dongjian* housing compound (where three
homes are currently located and two more had their origins), and three of the foster
homes—Good News, New Grace, and Red Thread. I contacted the majority of the
foster homes in Beijing, Xi’an and Shanghai, and almost all agreed to be
interviewed. However, given the lack of reliable data on the numbers of foreign
foster homes in China, it is difficult to be more definitive on this point. Two
Chinese homes were included in the study, both of which opened in the past three
years, the founders of which are aware of other Chinese friends in the planning
stages of copying the foster home model.
Of the sixteen foster homes interviewed, about half have investigated
becoming registered as charities; two have succeeded in obtaining an official,
formalized partnership with the central MCA after many years of operating quasilegally; similarly, two have obtained unofficial recognition of their work through
generalized contracts with nearby state-run orphanages. The remaining homes
either are not legal entities, or have registered as commercial entities. 200
Accordingly, these homes care for children who officially remain under the
guardianship of state orphanages, which means they have extensive interactions
with these government institutions.
When striking up a relationship of trust with state orphanages, the foster
homes follow a predictable pattern, which usually begins with a personal contact
at a state orphanage or after a foreigner has volunteered at the orphanage for some
time. As trust is built, often over many years, there may come a point where an
individual feels confident enough to request to take one or more children home for
prolonged, high quality, specialist medical treatment or care that the state
orphanage is unable to provide. The state orphanage director must be convinced to
release the child to the care of a foreigner and, in many cases, to allow the child to
remain with the fosterer after treatment and until adoption. Over time, as trust
develops and the foster home’s capacity is expanded, more and more children
come to be residents of the private home. Small, short-term operations can expand
to the point where, as in the largest of the case studies, several hundred children
are being cared for outside of the state orphanage, which continues to receive
government funding for those children. It is not just a matter of relocating children
to a nearby facility under the close supervision of the state orphanage. Most foster
homes are caring for children from distant provinces, with little to no ongoing
interaction with the home orphanage. Children frequently are taken overseas for
surgeries, often for months or years at a time, or may receive surgery in Shanghai,
200

Commercial registration is often more convenient than acting as a non-entity,
particularly in relation to issuing visas, and at least provides a veneer of legitimacy to an
organization by vesting it with legal personality.

2013]

CHINA’S ORPHAN WELFARE SYSTEM

169

Beijing, or the foster home itself. Given the extreme health issues experienced by
most new arrivals, deaths are very common.
Often, the foster home will require a contract to be signed, which
stipulates that the child will not be called back to the state orphanage at any time.
Alternatively, the state orphanage director may require a contract stipulating that
all living and treatment costs will be borne by the foster home. The binding nature
of these contracts is questionable, given that they are often signed in the name of
an organization that has no legal identity. Regardless, due to the sensitivity toward
foreign foster care, interviewees do not consider recourse to state dispute
resolution procedures in the event of a disagreement to be a realistic avenue.
The relationship with state orphanages largely depends on personal ties
between directors and policy pressure on state orphanages, and is often unstable.
In 2007, Tianjin Orphanage, which had children in the care of five of the
interviewed organizations, abruptly and without warning, required all of those
children to be returned to Tianjin. Reportedly, this was the result of a change in
directorship, as well as a policy shift in Beijing towards improving institutional
standards and away from Chinese and expatriate foster families. As Blue Sky Plan
finances were distributed to state orphanages, directors with new but empty beds
felt pressured to recall children who were residing with local foster families and
foreign-run foster homes. This policy shift was more keenly felt by Tianjin
Orphanage that by more rural orphanages, and Tianjin experienced more scrutiny
than did more remote institutions because of the proliferation of foreign foster
homes in the nearby Dongjian. Overall, the security of children who are residents
of private foster homes is tenuous at best, and depends on the foster home
maintaining rapport with the associated state orphanages: “The kids are not ours.
At any moment, they can take the kids back, and they have done so in the past.”201
The foster homes are careful to be, and to appear to be, uninvolved with
adoption processes, although most aim to provide medical attention that allows a
child to be moved from the special needs adoption register to the general adoption
register, thus increasing their chances of placement. On occasion, some
organizations will use personal contacts within the China Center of Adoption
Affairs or a particularly foreigner-friendly state orphanage to match a difficult
special needs case with a family willing to adopt that child; however, this special
channel is used rarely to maintain its efficacy.
The foster home interviewees varied in the level of concern they expressed
about the difficulties of operating orphanages without formal recognition and/or
legal status. About half have investigated the possibility of formal registration as a
201
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foreign NGO in China. Some interviewees, echoing many of the Chinese private
orphanages, expressed concern that “legalization” and government oversight
could, in fact, hinder their ability to carry out their work and choose their foster
home’s direction. The practical issues raised by the foreign foster homes related,
for the most part, to the impact of their lack of charitable or, in some cases, any,
legal status in China. One interviewee also expressed concern about the lack of
minimum care standards imposed on the activities of the foster homes.
One disadvantage of operating as a non-entity is that operators must
transact leases, banking transactions, and employment contracts in their personal
capacity, rather than in the name of the foster home. This practice results in substandard banking and employment practices, and exposes signatories to legal
liability in relation to such contracts, a situation about which many interviewees
expressed unease. Likewise, banking restrictions create obstacles for all of the
foster homes interviewed. Those homes that operate as non-entities cannot open
bank accounts in the foster home’s name, which means that they must use
unrelated, personal bank accounts to receive donations. This can cause
transparency issues for international donors.
The foster homes that are registered commercially (usually as a
Representative Office of an overseas parent company) can open accounts, but
these are of limited utility because RO bank accounts can only receive funds
transferred from the bank account of the RO parent company. 202 Donations
received domestically, or from a donor unable to donate to the jurisdiction of the
parent company, must be channeled through a personal bank account, which raises
the same issues as non-entities.203 Further, the amount that can be withdrawn from
a personal bank account is limited to $50,000 per year,204 which is far below the
annual operating costs of all interviewed foster homes.
The lack of government funding is less important for foreign-run foster
homes than it is for Chinese orphanages because operating costs largely are met by
international donors. Of the interviewees, only two expressed a desire for
government recognition as a means of securing financial support. Foreigners
running orphanages in China usually set up charitable entities in their home
jurisdictions to facilitate international donations and enhance their legitimacy in
the eyes of donors. This option generally is not feasible for Chinese-run
orphanages because of the expense and their geographical and technical isolation.
Aside from the difficulty of channeling such donations into China, fundraising
restrictions preclude attempts to increase the proportion of domestic donations. All
202
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the foster homes interviewed, whether unregistered, commercially registered, or
NGO-registered, face severe limitations in their fundraising efforts because of
restrictions on the issuance of tax-deductible receipts. Many interviewees
speculated that they have probably missed out on significant sources of funding
from local corporations interested in their work, due to the inability to provide an
official fapiao.205 Will Peters states, “The government is creating a monopoly on
charitable organizations,” 206 referring to the China Charity Federation. Tax
deductibility is governed by the 1999 Public Welfare Donations Law,207 which
provides that companies or individuals who donate to NGOs in accordance with
the Donations Law will enjoy preferential tax treatment. 208 However, such
preferential treatment is only granted if the State Administration of Taxation
approves the NGO in question as a tax-deductible donee. Currently, only the
China Charity Federation and a select group of related government-organized
NGOs209 can issue tax-deductible fapiao for charitable donations.210 Accordingly,
other NGOs, whether registered or not, must partner with a GONGO if a donor
requires a tax deduction. Many NGOs avoid such a partnership because of the
large “administration fees,” usually between ten and twelve percent, charged by
most GONGOs for this service. It can also be difficult for an unregistered charity
to find a GONGO willing to provide administrative banking support.
205
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As was the case for the Chinese-run private orphanages, because almost
all of the foreign foster homes interviewed do not have legal status, they are not
subject to formal supervision of internal governance, financial management, and
care practices. Like the Chinese interviewees, this was not a concern raised by
most of the foreign interviewees, who believe “[i]f the Chinese government just
gets out of our way, that’s a big help.” Generally, the foreigners had greater
administrative capabilities than did the Chinese interviewees, and all were able to
explain detailed good governance practices aimed at fulfilling a self-imposed and
self-regulated duty of accountability to donors and supporters. Many expressed
concern that changing the status quo would impinge on the freedom they
experience by operating outside of the legal framework. However, David Dale of
New Grace was an exception:
The danger is there’s no defined system or standard of care, even
in the state orphanages. So you end up with everyone doing what
everyone thinks is right or best. And you have to ask yourself –
are we really caring for the children well enough? I think we are.
But that’s just our judgment. That judgment should really be made
by government, not us.211

CONCLUSION
We hope the government will one day see the needs of these
children, and see that we also, with sincere good faith, are sharing
the government’s responsibility. This is our country’s issue. We
are willing to sacrifice, in the spirit of our country, sacrifice our
hearts, to build up China. We are willing to act in concert with
them. We hope that one day what we are doing will be recognized
by government. We have been doing this work for twenty-two
years, the first child we took in is now thirty years old. Their law
says this—that orphanages are a governmental responsibility. But
we are the ones implementing orphan protection.212
This introduction to China’s orphan welfare sector shows the intersection
of factors that impact potential outcomes for China’s vulnerable children.
Abandonment, as in other countries, has a long history in China, and insufficient
information is available on its current incidence, particularly in relation to disabled
children and infants. Researchers agree that top-down policy changes are required
211
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to support parents in fulfilling their parental duties and expand the scope and
supervision of NGOs in providing child welfare.213 However, it is apparent that
bottom-up shifts in cultural discourse on child rights, disability, and adoption are
both occurring and needed. Cultural norms influence notions of kinship, as well as
formal and informal adoption patterns. This complex combination of norms and
practices has created an equally complex web of state and non-state welfare
providers, and insufficient attention has been paid to the possible influence of
orphanages on cultural ideas about, and incidences of, abandonment.
These contextual factors shape the role of non-state institutional actors,
both Chinese and foreign, in caring for China’s “lonely children.” The government
continues to maintain an ostensible monopoly on the institutional and short-term
foster care of orphans, consistent with its objectives of maintaining tight control
over civic organizations and religious-based and foreign-led activities. On the
other hand, the inadequacy of state provision is demonstrable in two ways. First, a
lack of rural facilities has resulted in an unknown number of de facto unregistered
orphanages arising in areas inadequately served by state orphanages, many of
which are run by the underground church and care for unregistered children on an
ad hoc basis. Second, the standard of care provided in urban welfare institutions is
considered by many, especially foreigners importing their own standards and
expectations of child care, to be inadequate or open to improvement, and this
attitude has led to the rise in the number of foreign foster homes caring for
registered welfare recipients in an informal, undocumented, and unrecognized
manner. Government policy on non-state orphanages is ambiguous, inconsistent,
and opaque, but as long as state institutions are overwhelmed by their duty to care
for China’s orphans, the non-state sector will grow organically in response to a
demand for more accessible orphan care, and the gap between law and practice in
the orphan welfare system, a gap so commonly observed in China, will endure.
As private orphanages persevere, the cautious evolution of a sector in
which multiple politically sensitive aspects intersect is an example of the transition
from “welfare statism” to “welfare pluralism,”214 and the government’s increasing
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openness to allow non-state provision of services. Further, the spontaneous
emergence of non-state actors to fill gaps in rural welfare provision is an important
feature of the ongoing rural-urban divide that pervades modern Chinese welfare
provision regimes. Beyond these implications for social policy research are
broader social implications for outcomes of children who are residents of non-state
institutions.
Wang describes the drawing of a line of stratification among Chinese
children in terms of their health and suzhi (quality); similarly, the emergence of
non-state orphanages, in which children generally lack hukou, has created a line of
stratification among orphans in terms of their access to basic citizenship rights.
The orphans and foundlings who are cared for by urban state institutions
increasingly are likely to be cared for by foreign foster homes, which results in
access to higher adoption prospects and standard of living in the interim, and
compounds the rural-urban stratification among vulnerable children.
Madam Leng, the director and founder of Star Village, gives a monthly
lecture to all the children in the care of Star Village’s many homes around China
entitled “lü zai hefang?” (where is the road that should be taken?). The children of
Star Village are raised by loving caregivers, and are taught to hope for a better
future and take steps to achieve independence and a fulfilling life. But the
question, “Where is the way?,” is asked by many observers about unregulated
Chinese private orphanages: is the current approach to law, policy, order, and
governance satisfactory? It is difficult to assess the impact on China’s orphans, or
the lack thereof, from regulation of the private orphan welfare sector. Adoption
prospects and care standards are increased for those residing in foster homes or
benefiting from collaborative projects with state institutions, which means many of
the foster homes are saving and transforming significant numbers of lives by
providing care that state orphanages may not be able to provide.
On the other hand, momentum in political or social advocacy for
improved orphanage conditions by foreign workers is nonexistent due to the risk
such advocacy would bring to their personal work in China. The sector’s growth is
soft and slow; relationships between foster homes and both government and state
orphanages are built gradually and tentatively by players astute and sensitive to the
different and often conflicting considerations at play. In some grassroots Chineserun private orphanages the quality of care is high, although in many cases,
economic backwardness is evident, children suffer the effects of the foster home
lacking a legal status, and standards of care are set internally, with grave concerns
expressed by observers about care practices. While increased regulation and
oversight of the sector, done in a formal and standardized way, might not lead to
facilitating civic/private financial support of welfare programs and initiatives. Shang,
Better Way supra note 11, at 204.
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improved orphanage conditions (indeed, whether taking responsibility for the
supervision and registration of the homes is a viable option politically or
economically is questionable), Shang’s calls for increased regulation of the sector
are understandable given the Chinese government’s claims about its responsibility
for orphans, and given the nexus between birth planning policies, abandonment,
and human rights obligations.215
Arguably, the Chinese government has a duty to allow private orphanages
and foster homes to openly and freely engage in the welfare sector in order to
improve the quality of life for Chinese abandoned children. However, due to a lack
of formal oversight, this is not being done in a standardized or supervised manner.
By keeping laws and policies that restrict orphanage operations to state actors
while allowing unofficial policy to flourish as long as informal norms are
followed, the government can maintain the fiction that only China cares for
Chinese children and allow private organizations to assist overwhelmed local
governments in orphan welfare. Further, such private charities can be unofficially
but closely monitored, tightly controlled, and do not cause embarrassment by
drawing attention to the disparity because they are aware of the shadow of state
power and formal law. The lawyer for Shooting Star states, “The government
wants to have its cake and eat it too—it wants to let NGOs function in China,
without legitimizing them, but while keeping control over them. They are walking
a tight-rope.” Given the symbolic function of laws that restrict the care of orphans
to Chinese institutions, an ideology reflective of cultural pride regarding foreign
charity in China, the law/practice gap may be a means to maintain the fiction that
“China looks after its own children” while allowing beneficent foreigners to
quietly help China’s orphanages provide better care for its children. Regulation of
the sector, or reversion to formal laws and policies, could draw attention to the
discrepancy between fact and fiction, a fiction in which much political and cultural
pride seems to be invested, and result in more restrictions on foreign foster homes
than are currently imposed. While there is flexibility associated with the current
mode of governance and back turning, of which many workers are adept at taking
advantage, this is not a satisfactory way to encourage growth in the charity sector
or achieve better care outcomes for children. The personal moral codes of many
individuals are sustaining them in their work, but are not always an adequate
safeguard against abuse and death within the homes, especially given the lack of
training and finances. For example, in Yangtze Orphanage, the slogan “it’s for
orphans” is being used for self-serving purposes to the disadvantage of resident
children.
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Shang et al., Welfare Provision, supra note 4, at 136.
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Generally, the plight of orphans and vulnerable children in China has
received increased attention in recent years, largely due to Hu Jintao’s “blue sky”
call and associated MCA activity. However, many workers remain convinced that
a general apathy towards orphans persists in Chinese society, which relates to the
conception of rights contingent on one’s instrumental value to society rather than
rights contingent on one’s intrinsic worth as an individual. The traditional focus on
duties over rights, and society over the individual, remains evident in the treatment
of orphans and the policies and practices governing the institutions that care for
these children. Madam Leng’s question, therefore, seems pertinent: Where is the
way forward? There is a pressing need to address the question of how the state,
private orphanages and foster homes can co-exist in a mutually beneficial
relationship, given how high the stakes are for China’s orphans.

